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•	 The	 end	 of	 large-scale	 hostilities	 and	 the	 crushing	 of	 the	
armed	 underground	 resistance	 in	 Chechnya	 have,	 over	 the	
past	few	years,	led	to	a	stabilisation	of	the	situation	in	the	re-
public,	which	–	 alongside	 the	 improvements	 in	Russia’s	 eco-
nomic	 situation	 during	 the	 first	 period	 of	 Vladimir	 Putin’s	
government	–	has	become	a	symbol	of	 the	success	of	his	po-
litical	system.	However,	the	Chechen	issue	remains	one	of	the	













of	 the	 second	 Chechen	 war	 (1999/2000)	 between	 the	 Kady-
rovs	(first	Ahmad,	then	his	son	Ramzan)	and	Putin;	the	plan	
for	governing	Chechnya	which	 remains	valid	 to	 the	present	
day;	and	the	relationship	between	Moscow	and	Grozny.	In	ex-











































tion	 of	 the	Chechen	 leader’s	 irreplaceability,	 raise	 questions	
about	his	 loyalty	 and	 the	possibility	 that	he	may	openly	 re-

























of	 Russian	 foreign	 policy.	 Inside	 Russia	 and	 the	 post-Soviet	
area,	Chechens	play	a	deterrent	 role,	 and	are	 seen	as	brutal	







that	 the	 Chechenisation	 policy	 has	 brought	 lasting	 peace	 in	
Chechnya,	 or	 that	 President	 Putin	 has	 successfully	 resolved	
the	 Chechen	 issue.	 The	 current	 plan	 for	 governing	 a	 stable	
Chechnya	and	the	relationship	between	Moscow	and	Grozny	







of	 calls	 for	 independence	 in	 Chechnya.	 Due	 to	 the	 strength	

















I. The PuTIn–Kadyrov PacT
Vladimir	Putin	 inherited	 the	unresolved	problem	of	Chechnya	
from	Boris	Yeltsin.	Throughout	the	1990s	Chechnya	was	a	sym-
bol	 of	 collapse,	 a	 synonym	 for	 the	 humiliation	 of	 the	 Russian	
state	that	had	lost	the	military	and	political	confrontation	with	
militants	 fighting	 to	 create	 an	 independent	 Chechen	 state2.	




while	 still	 prime	 minister.	 In	 the	 first	 months	 of	 the	 second	
Chechen	war,	which	began	 in	 the	 late	 summer	and	autumn	of	
1999,	and	was	conducted	under	 the	banner	of	 the	fight	against	
international	 Islamist	 terrorism,	 the	actions	of	Russian	 troops	




a	 few	months,	and	took	control	over	 the	territory	of	 the	whole	
republic,	although	they	did	not	break	the	resistance	of	the	nu-
merous	guerrilla	groups.
The	 guerrillas’	 military	 defeat	 obliged	 the	 Kremlin	 to	 rule	
Chechen	 territory	 directly.	 Contrary	 to	 expectations,	 Putin’s	
administration	 rejected	 both	 cooperation	 with	 the	 tradition-
ally	pro-Russian	Chechen	groups	(activists	mainly	derived	from	



























ners	 in	 Chechnya,	 either	 for	 opportunistic	 or	 ideological	 rea-
sons	(as	they	opposed	the	Islamic	radicalism	which	was	begin-
ning	to	dominate	among	the	armed	guerrillas3),	as	they	decided	




son	 Ramzan).	 The	 other	 Chechen	 political	 groups	 have	 been	
moved	 into	 the	 shadows	and	marginalised,	 including	Chechen	







































the	 republic	 to	 the	Chechen	authorities,	while	 limiting	 the	 in-
fluence	of	the	federal	authorities,	particularly	the	law	enforce-
ment	 agencies4.	 The	 symbolic	 culmination	 of	 this	 process	was	
the	 abolition	 of	 the	 counter-terrorist	 operation	 regime	 in	 the	




sian	power	structures,	dissatisfied	with	 the	 limitation	of	 their	
power	in	Chechnya,	were	most	probably	responsible5.	Vladimir	
Putin,	however,	decided	to	continue	the	current	policy,	and	des-
ignated	 as	 Ahmad’s	 successor	 his	 son,	 Ramzan,	 then	 an	 inex-
perienced	 28-year-old6.	 Despite	 initial	 concerns	 about	 his	 lack	























































II. The effecTs of chechenIsaTIon
1. stabilisation





of	Kadyrov’s	 power,	 the	best	 proof	 of	which	 is	 the	 constant	 fall	
in	the	figures	on	armed	incidents	and	victims	of	violence8.	This	
stabilisation	 has	 been	 possible	 thanks	 to	 Kadyrov’s	 application	
(with	the	Kremlin’s	approval)	of	an	entire	spectrum	of	political,	
military,	 economic	 and	 ideological	measures	which	 have	 led	 to	





ulgation	of	a	 succession	of	amnesties,	 and	by	 the	Kadyrovs	 (the	
process	was	 begun	 by	Ahmad	 and	 continued	 by	 Ramzan)	win-
ning	 over	 individuals	 and	 armed	 groups	 following	negotiations	






























militants	 did	 not	 actually	 lay	 down	 their	 weapons,	 but	 began	
serving	 in	 various	 armed	 formations	 within	 Chechnya,	 which	




as	hostages,	 demolishing	 their	 houses,	 etc.).	 The	 terror	used	 by	
the	Kadyrovs	(Ramzan	in	particular;	Ahmad	tended	to	use	milder	





nomic	 reconstruction	 (based	 on	 federal	 subsidies)	 of	 the	whole	
republic	(not	just	Grozny,	but	also	other	areas)	from	the	devasta-
tion	of	war;	and	 the	guarantee	of	basic	 living	standards	 for	 the	
population	(for	example	by	creating	jobs	in	administration	or	the	







































of	 Islam,	contrasted	with	 ‘Wahhabism’12.	The	promotion	of	an	 ide-





armed	 underground,	 and	 strengthening	 Kadyrov’s	 own	 position.
2. The establishment of Kadyrov’s dictatorship
Another	effect	of	Kadyrov’s	activities	has	been	the	formation	 in	
Chechnya	 of	 an	 authoritarian	 political	 regime.	Kadyrov	 has	 ef-








































solved	 under	 pressure	 from	 Kadyrov).	 Kadyrov	 has	 also	 estab-













































of	 brutal	 violence,	 smashing	 up	 offices	 etc.),	 have	 been	 forced	 to	
stop	operating	on	the	republic’s	territory	(such	as	the	Russia-wide	
Memorial	organisation	and	the	Committee	Against	Torture15).	The	


















































lines,	 various	 construction	 companies18,	 and	 the	 Terek	 Grozny	
football	 club).	However,	 the	 income	 from	 economic	 activities	 is	
not	 the	main	 economic	 resource	 of	 Kadyrov’s	 financial	 empire.	
This	relies	on	subsidies	from	the	Russian	budget19	and	the	‘alter-
native	tax	system’,	which	consists	of	extorting	protection	money	
from	 Chechen	 businessmen	 (including	 those	 living	 outside	 the	





(construction,	 the	renovation	of	 facilities	 such	as	mosques	both	
within	the	republic	and	abroad)	and	charity	(providing	support	
to	poor	families,	invalids,	etc.)20.
3. chechnya: a foreign enclave within the russian 
federation
The	 results	 of	 the	 Chechenisation	 policy,	 which	was	 intended	
more	to	isolate	Chechnya	within	Russia	rather	than	integrate	it	
with	 the	rest	of	 the	Russian	Federation,	go	 far	beyond	the	sta-
















































identity,	but	also	 the	regulator	of	 family	and	social	 life.	At	 the	
same	time,	demodernisation	on	the	social	level	is	being	followed	





is	widespread	 today).	These	 social	 processes	 are	 largely	 a	 con-
tinuation	of	earlier	trends,	which	can	be	traced	to	the	effects	of	
the	two	Chechen	wars	(mainly	the	transformation	of	Chechnya	

























plies	 in	Chechnya,	 the	republic	 is	de facto	governed	by	a	mixture	





































































































and	personnel	bases	 for	Chechen	statehood	 (although	 it	 is	diffi-
cult	to	say	to	what	extent	this	is	a	deliberate	and	planned	action).	
In	 the	 Chechens’	 recent	 history,	 they	 have	made	 two	 attempts	
to	 found	an	 independent	 state:	 in	 1991-1994	and	 1996-1999.	Both	
ended	in	failure,	not	only	as	a	result	of	Russian	military	interven-
tion,	but	also	because	of	 the	 inability	of	Chechnya’s	 society	and	
elites	to	lay	the	foundations	to	form	a	state	(a	functioning	admin-
istration,	 guarantees	 of	 personal	 security,	 a	 functioning	 econo-
my,	etc.),	which	led	to	a	double	transformation	of	Chechnya	into	





















III. ramzan Kadyrov: PuTIn’s ProblemaTIc 
buT useful vassal
1. Kadyrov’s activity: political ambitions and feudal logic
Having	disposed	of	his	most	dangerous	opponents	and	strength-
ened	his	power	in	Chechnya,	Ramzan	Kadyrov	began	to	play	a	po-
litical	 game	 that	 goes	 beyond	 Chechnya.	 One	 of	 the	most	 spec-
tacular	manifestations	of	Kadyrov’s	activity	was	the	participation	










Another	 equally	 spectacular	 example	 of	 Kadyrov’s	 political	 ac-
tivity	 is	 the	demonstrations	 of	his	 own	power	which	he	 organ-
ises.	 In	December	2014	a	 rally	was	held	at	a	 stadium	 in	Grozny,	




































































































































































































2. moscow’s problem with Kadyrov
Kadyrov’s	 independence	 and	 arbitrary	 behaviour	 in	 Chechnya,	
his	open	disregard	for	Russian	legislation	and	the	federal	authori-
ties,	and	the	activity	of	the	Chechen	leader	and	his	men	beyond	
the	borders	 of	 the	 republic,	 are	 the	 object	 of	 frequent	 criticism	
from	the	Russian	elite	(in	both	the	ruling	and	opposition	camps),	
as	 has	 been	 manifested	 in	 numerous	 publications	 and	 state-
ments	by	 journalists	 and	 experts,	 and	 in	 increasingly	open	 (by	
39	 A	group	of	more	than	a	dozen	fighters	of	the	Caucasus	Emirate	stormed	into	
the	city	centre	on	the	night	of	4/5	December	2014,	shooting	several	Chechen	














































































the	 funding	and	 functioning	of	 the	Ahmad	Kadyrov	Foundation,	













and	 the	 ‘siloviki’	 exploded	 into	 public	 view	 thanks	 to	 one	 such	






44	 According	 to	 reports	 in	 the	 Russian	 media,	 Kadyrov’s	 bodyguards	




















is	 Zaur	 Dadayev,	 a	 high-ranking	 officer	 in	 the	 Chechen	 ‘Sever’	
battalion48).
















































The	 risk	 of	 Kadyrov	 openly	 rebelling	 against	 Moscow	 is	 also	
minimal	 because	 of	 how	 the	 Chechen	 people	 themselves	 per-
ceive	 him.	 Chechen	 society,	 tired	 of	 long-term	war	 and	 terror-
ised	by	Kadyrov’s	people,	 is	 forced	 to	 tolerate	his	authority.	The	
people	appreciate	the	stability,	the	reconstruction	of	the	republic	
and	the	 improvement	of	 the	economic	situation	under	Kadyrov.	














ciety,	moreover,	 issues	 of	honour	 (especially	 that	 of	 the	 family)	
and	the	duty	to	declare	vendettas	against	injustice	were	of	great	
importance.	Kadyrov	and	his	men	have	been	committing	crimes	






































Soviet	 area	 indicates	 that	Russian	elites	do	not	 see	 the	problem	
of	 internal	 separatism	as	a	 serious,	present	 threat.	Moscow	has	
inspired	and	exploited	separatist	tendencies	in	its	own	imperial	
policy	for	many	years,	actively	and	without	fear	of	domestic	re-
percussions,	 including	 separatism	 in	 the	 Caucasus	 (including	
Abkhazia,	South	Ossetia,	northern	Azerbaijan,	 the	Georgian	 Ja-
vakheti,	as	well	as	Ukraine	and	Central	Asia).	The	biggest	prob-































less,	 cruel,	 rebellious,	 lacking	any	 fear	of	 consequences,	 closed-
off,	with	an	incomprehensible	culture	and	mentality.	They	arouse	







dle	 East	 and	 the	 Islamic	world.	While	 it	 represented	 a	 problem	
in	Russia’s	relations	with	Islamic	countries	during	the	two	wars	
(the	 elite	 and	publics	 in	 those	 countries	 saw	 the	Chechen	wars	
as	 a	 defensive	 jihad,	 and	 as	 proof	 of	 the	 anti-Islamic	 nature	 of	
Russian	policy),	it	has	now	evolved	into	a	Russian	asset.	This	Is-
lamised	Chechnya,	in	which	sharia	 is	becoming	stronger,	whose	
leader	rebuilds	mosques,	pays	visits	 to	 Islamic	countries,	and	 is	
seeking	investment	from	Gulf	states,	and	defends	the	good	name	
of	Muhammad,	relics	of	whom	he	brought	to	Chechnya	(see	the	
































































the	 superficial	 (and	 inherently	unstable)	 informal	arrangement	
between	 Putin	 and	 Kadyrov,	 which	 is	 underpinned	 by	 a	 tem-
porary	 convergence	 of	 interests	 between	 these	 two	 politicians.	
Under	 favourable	conditions,	 the	 idea	of	 	Chechen	 independence	
could	once	again	re-emerge.
The	 risk	 of	 the	 agreement	 between	Moscow	 and	 Grozny	 being	
broken,	 and	 the	 re-emergence	 of	 Chechen	 pro-independence	
rhetoric,	is	linked	to	the	possible	replacement	of	the	President	of	
Russia	or	 the	 leader	of	Chechnya	 (although	 this	 seems	unlikely	
during	the	reign	of	Putin,	it	cannot	be	ruled	out	that	for	example	
















































ethnic	 conflicts	 throughout	 the	Caucasus	 (including	Dagestani/
















widen	 as	 a	 result	 of	 attempts	 to	 exploit	 the	 region	 in	 domestic	
Russian	 conflicts	 (as	was	 seen	 repeatedly	 during	 the	 1990s,	 for	
example	 Putin’s	 position	 was	 reinforced	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 sec-
ond	Chechen	war).	The	idea	of	 	independence	would	also	have	to	
compete	with	another,	no	less	important	idea	with	equally	strong	












































sacrifices	 that	 the	Chechens	have	suffered	so	 far	 in	 their	strug-
gle	 for	 independence	 from	Russia.	 Such	a	 turn	of	 events	 is	 also	
foreshadowed	by	the	history	of	Russia,	which	is	about	to	confront	
deep	internal	crises	resulting	in	the	weakening	or	loss	of	its	con-
trol	over	the	periphery,	as	well	as	the	present,	deteriorating	state	
of	Russia	itself	(its	rising	political,	economic,	social,	demographic	
and	ethnic	problems).
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